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ABSTRACT
ADDRESSING/EXPLOITING TRANSCEIVER
IMPERFECTIONS IN WIRELESS COMMUNICATION
SYSTEMS
SEPTEMBER 2011
LIHAO WANG
B.S., UNIVERSITY OF JINAN
M.S.E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Dennis L. Geockel
This thesis consists of two research projects on wireless communication systems.
In the first project, we propose a fast inphase and quadrature (I/Q) imbalance com-
pensation technique for the analog quadrature modulators in direct conversion trans-
mitters. The method needs no training sequence, no extra background data gathering
process and no prior perfect knowledge of the envelope detector characteristics. In
contrast to previous approaches, it uses points from both the linear and predictable
nonlinear regions of the envelope detector to hasten convergence. We provide a least
mean square (LMS) version and demonstrate that the quadrature modulator com-
pensator converges.
In the second project, we propose a technique to deceive the automatic gain control
(AGC) block in an eavesdropper’s receiver to increase wireless physical layer data
transmission secrecy. By sharing a key with the legitimate receiver and fluctuating
vi
the transmitted signal power level in the transmitter side, a positive average secrecy
capacity can be achieved even when an eavesdropper has the same or even better
additive white gaussian noise (AWGN) channel condition. Then, the possible options
that an eavesdropper may choose to fight against our technique are discussed and
analyzed, and approaches to eliminate these options are proposed. We demonstrate
that a positive average secrecy capacity can still be achieved when an eavesdropper
uses these options.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
In a world of increasing mobility, the demand for wireless communication sys-
tems has led to a better understanding of fundamental issues in communication
theory. However, most communication theory works with idealized transceiver as-
sumptions neglecting imperfections and defects of practical transceiver designs. In
reality, there exists challenges and opportunities in understanding wireless transceiver
non-idealities.
For direct conversion transceivers, a prerequisite of digital predistortion of the
power amplifier nonlinear transfer function is compensating inphase and quadrature
(I/Q) imbalance in transmitters. In order to predistort the power amplifier within a
reasonable number of iterations, the error figure (EF) should be mitigated below the
level in (1.1) [1]:
EF =
ε2 + ϕ2
4
+
c21 + c
2
2
Pq
< 10−4 (1.1)
where ε, ϕ, c1 and c2 are the gain imbalance (ε), phase imbalance (ϕ) and dc-offsets
(c1, c2), respectively, and Pq is the average power at the quadrature modulator (QM)
output. In this thesis, such an I/Q imbalance compensation technique is designed
and analyzed.
Another important issue considered in this thesis is whether we can utilize the
defects of practical receivers to increase data transmission security. Most of the former
information theoretical approaches based on idealized transceiver assumptions have
few concerns about the defects of RF receiver front-ends. In this thesis, we analyze the
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practical design of an eavesdropper’s RF receiver front-end and propose a technique
to deceive it.
Therefore, this thesis can be classified into two parts:
1. An inphase and quadrature(I/Q) imbalance compensation technique for the
analog quadrature modulators in direct conversion transmitters.
2. A technique to deceive the automatic gain control(AGC) block in an eaves-
dropper’s receiver to increase wireless physical layer data transmission secrecy.
1.1.1 Imperfections in Direct Conversion Transmitters
Direct conversion transmitters are attractive due to increased efficiency and hard-
ware simplicity. However, their use is limited because of I/Q imbalance in analog
quadrature modulators. Although I/Q imbalance compensation is a topic which of-
ten appears in the literature, most of these approaches concern compensation methods
in the receiver, but compensation methods for the transmitter are a significant issue
as well.
In the transmitter, to achieve linearization of the power amplifier, which is another
important step to increase the performance of direct conversion transmitters, the I/Q
imbalance should first be mitigated, because its presence makes perfect predistortion
for linearizaton impossible. Therefore, in the first part of our thesis, we will address
this issue and propose an I/Q imbalance compensation technique for the transmitter
that converges more rapidly than previously proposed methods.
1.1.2 Physical Layer Security
Wireless communications, which are particularly susceptible to eavesdropping be-
cause of the broadcast nature of the transmission medium, continue to flourish world-
wide. Therefore, the encryption for securing information in wireless systems has taken
on an increasingly important role. In general, encryption is done above the physical
layer with powerful cyphers using cryptographic protocols (e.g., RSA and AES). In
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contrast, theoretical physical layer security contributions, which builds on Shannon’s
notion of perfect secrecy[19], significantly strengthen the security of digital commu-
nication systems. In spite of numerous theoretical contributions, the consideration of
implementation aspects of a practical eavesdropper receiver, which may have some
defects that could be utilized to decrease the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of its received
signal, has not received much attention.
For a digital communication system, the analog-to-digital converter in the receiver
has a fixed dynamic range. However, the received signal varies over a wider range.
Therefore, an automatic gain control (AGC) circuit is necessary before the analog-to-
digital converter (ADC) to keep the signal amplitude at a apriori fixed level. There
exists several works [11][12][13][14] on designing a decibel-based linear AGC system
with constant settling time which operates as a high pass filter. In the settling period
of the AGC, the signal amplitude may be outside the apriori fixed level and cause
clipping of the ADC, which introduces a large amount of quantization noise. Thus,
our approach to artificially change the transmitted signal amplitude level may deceive
the AGC-ADC cascade in the eavesdropper.
1.2 Contribution
The main contribution in the first part of the thesis is a faster I/Q imbalance
compensation technique, which employs a more accurate parametrization that ac-
counts for both the linear and square law regions of the envelope detector. The
method needs no training sequence, no extra background data gathering process and
no prior perfect knowledge of the envelope detector characteristics. Part two of the
thesis contributes towards a thorough analysis of a typical eavesdropper’s receiver
RF front-end, especially the AGC system block. We propose a varied power ampli-
fication technique which could deceive the AGC-ADC cascade in the eavesdropper’s
receiver while maintaining the function of the legitimate receiver. It is shown that a
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positive average secrecy capacity can be achieved even if the legitimate receiver Bob
has no additive white gaussian noise (AWGN) channel signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
advantage. The technique successfully turns a short-term cryptographic advantage
into everlasting security.
1.3 Organization
This thesis is organized broadly in two sections. Chapter 2 is the first section of
the thesis and presents the I/Q imbalance compensation technique. In Chapter 2,
the operating characteristic of the envelope detector is analyzed and an adaptation
algorithm employing sample points falling into the envelope detector’s linear and
square law regions is proposed. Then, we prove that the proposed algorithm has a
least mean square (LMS) implementation that drives the overall impairments in the
quadrature modulator compensator (QMC) and quadrature modulator (QM) cascade
to zero. Chapter 3 considers considering physical layer secrecy issues. The AGC block
of the eavesdropper receiver is analyzed and a technique to deceive the AGC-ADC
cascade of the eavesdropper receiver is proposed. Then, the possible options that
Eve may use to fight against the proposed technique are discussed and eliminated.
Chapter 4 summarizes our thesis work based on the results from Chapter 2 and 3.
4
CHAPTER 2
I/Q IMBALANCE COMPENSATION
2.1 Introduction
Analog quadrature modulators (QM) are commonly implemented in direct con-
version transceiver designs due to their wider bandwidth and lower power consump-
tion compared to all-DSP based approaches [2]. However, they have three principle
impairments [3]: gain imbalance, phase imbalance and dc-offset, which can have a
devastating effect on amplifier linearization circuits. There are several existing com-
pensation techniques [2][3][4][5][6] that employ a digital signal processor (DSP) or
analog circuit. Most of these approaches are adaptive to maintain acceptable perfor-
mance quality, because these impairments are expected to change with temperature,
channel frequency and device biasing [4]. In [7] and [8], a recursive least squares
(RLS) method and an adaptive traditional least mean square (LMS) method have
been proposed respectively, both of which can adapt from random transmitted data
and need no prior knowledge of the envelope detector’s characteristic. These ap-
proaches simplify algorithm development by only using sample points that fall into
the envelope detector’s linear region, and the remainder of the points are ignored.
2.2 System Model
The model of the amplifier linearization loop based on predistortion used in [7]
is considered in this letter, as shown in Fig. 2.1. vd(t) is the baseband signal after
predistortion and vq(t) is the complex bandpass signal. There are two feedback loops
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in the system model: the first is for predistorter (PD) adaptation with a quadra-
ture demodulator (QDM) and its compensator (QDMC); the other loop is for QM
compensator (QMC) adaptation with an envelope detector. This chapter focuses on
the latter one, which drives the complex bandpass signal vq(t) to an envelope detec-
tor. The output of the envelope detector Veo(t) is then directed to the adaptation
algorithm for the QMC, which adjusts the parameters of the QMC using Veo(t) and
vd(t).
Figure 2.1. An amplifier linearization loop based on predistortion
Figure 2.2. Internal structure of the QMC and QM cascade
6
2.2.1 The QM and Compensator
The quadrature modulator is the interface between the baseband digital signals
and the RF transmission bandpass signals. For the analysis, a symmetric model
for the internal QM and QMC is illustrated in Fig. 2.2. Following [7] closely, we
use the matrix representations to demonstrate the characteristics of the QM and
QMC. We represent the QM and QMC internal parameters by the subscript p and c
respectively, and denote the overall QM-the cascade of QMC and QM, by no subscript.
Then, the primary impairments of the QM can be summarized in the error vector
q = [εp φp cp1 cp2]
T , where εp is the gain imbalance, φp is the phase imbalance and
cp1 and cp2 are the real and imaginary dc offsets, and
εp = γp − 1 and γp = αp/βp (2.1)
In (2.1), γp is the gain ratio and αp and βp are the gains in the real and imaginary
branches. We can calculate the two gains αp and βp when knowing the gain imbalance
εp[2] by
αp = (1 + εp)
√
2
2 + 2εp + ε2p
βp =
√
2
2 + 2εp + ε2p
(2.2)
The QMC transfer characteristic is then
~vc = Mc ~vd + ~cc (2.3)
where ~vd and ~vc are length-2 vectors denoting the real and imaginary components of
the corresponding complex signals, cc is the vector of real and imaginary dc offsets,
and
Mc =
 αc cos(φc2 ) βc sin(φc2 )
αc sin(
φc
2
) βc cos(
φc
2
)
 (2.4)
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The QM transfer characteristic is then
~vq = Mp(~vc + ~cp) (2.5)
where
Mp =
 αp cos(φp2 ) αp sin(φp2 )
βp sin(
φp
2
) βp cos(
φp
2
)
 (2.6)
The overall QM (cascade of QMC and QM) transfer characteristic is then
~vq = MpMc ~vd +Mp(~cc + ~cp) (2.7)
Since εp and φp are normally very small, typically φp = 0.05 radians (3
◦) and
εp = 0.03, we can use the first-order series approximations αp ≈ 1 + εp2 , βp ≈ 1− εp2 .
In this case, the overall QM error vector equals the sum of the QMC and QM error
vectors, that is ~q ≈ ~qc+ ~qp. For small quantities ε, φ, c1, and c2, the complex bandpass
signal applied to the PA are denoted by a length-2 vector
~vq ≈
[
(1 + ε
2
)vd1 +
φ
2
vd2 + c1
φ
2
vd1 + (1− ε2)vd2 + c2
]T
(2.8)
where vd1, vd2 are the real and imaginary components of the predistorted input sig-
nal vd(t). From (2.8), ~vq 6= ~vd because of QM impairments. Thus, the adaptation
algorithm is critical to estimate and adjust the impairments of the overall QM by
adapting the DSP-based QMC parameters.
2.2.2 The Envelope Detector
Generally, an envelope detector operation characteristic can be divided into three
working regions: square law, transition and linear. For small signals (below some
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voltage level depending on the parameters of the specific envelope detector), the
envelope detector works in the square law region, which can be represented as
Veo = gslV
2
ei + dsl (2.9)
where gsl and dsl are the differential gain and bias of the square law region respec-
tively, and Vei = ‖~vq‖ is the ideal magnitude of the complex bandpass signal vq(t).
Expanding (2.8) and (2.9), and keeping only first order terms yields
Veo ≈ ~UTsl ~Xsl (2.10)
where
~Usl =

gsl
gslε
gslφ
gslc1
gslc2
dsl

, ~Xsl =

v2d1 + v
2
d2
v2d1 − v2d2
2vd1vd2
2vd1
2vd2
1

For slightly larger signals, the envelope detector works in the transition region,
whose characteristic is non-linear and unpredictable. However, for high voltage signals
(above some voltage level), the characteristic turns linear, which can be represented
as
Veo = glnVei + dln (2.11)
where gln is the differential gain of the envelope detector’s linear region and dln is its
bias. Similarly, expanding (2.8) and (2.11), the first-order approximation is
9
Veo ≈ ~UTln ~Xln (2.12)
where
~Uln =

gln
glnε
glnφ
glnc1
glnc2
dln

, ~Xln =

√
v2d1 + v
2
d2
(v2d1 − v2d2)/2
√
v2d1 + v
2
d2
vd1vd2/
√
v2d1 + v
2
d2
vd1/
√
v2d1 + v
2
d2
vd2/
√
v2d1 + v
2
d2
1

In order to use more signal points to increase the actual convergence speed, the
algorithm proposed works with both the square law and linear regions of the envelope
detector.
2.2.3 Proposed Adaptation Algorithm
The adaptive algorithm runs in a series of iterations. In each iteration, the algo-
rithm first obtains the estimate of the error vector ~ˆq using input ~vd and corresponding
envelope sample Veo. Assume the current input complex envelope is ~vd,k, where k is
the iteration number. If its corresponding digitalized envelope sample falls in the
square law region, (2.10) is applied; if it falls in the linear region, (2.12) is applied;
if it falls in the transition region, the algorithm does not update for this input and
corresponding output value. These steps are readily implemented in the DSP. We
use ~Xk to represent either ~Xsl,k or ~Xln,k and the same rule applies to ~Uk, g and d,
where the context will make clear the designation. Since this algorithm expands the
working region, it can use more input points than [7] and [8] to hasten convergence.
The operation of the adaptation algorithm at iteration k is given next. From (2.10)
or (2.12), calculate the corresponding vector ~Xk from the input ~vd,k = [vd1,k, vd2,k]
T .
Then the gradient estimate is
~ˆ∇k = −2ek ~Xk (2.13)
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and the error is
ek = Veo,k − ~ˆUTk ~Xk (2.14)
In (2.14), ~ˆUk is the estimate of vector ~U , either ~ˆUsl,k or ~ˆUln,k, with initial value
[1 0 0 0 0 0]T . With the gradient estimate (2.13),
~ˆUk+1 = ~ˆUk − µ~ˆ∇k (2.15)
where µ is the step size parameter that determines the tradeoff between the speed
and the stability of convergence. From (2.10) or (2.12)
εˆk = Uˆk+1[2]/Uˆk+1[1] φˆk = Uˆk+1[3]/Uˆk+1[1]
cˆ1,k = Uˆk+1[4]/Uˆk+1[1] cˆ2,k = Uˆk+1[5]/Uˆk+1[1]
(2.16)
where Uˆk[i] is the ith element of the vector ~ˆUk. Then the estimate error vector is
~ˆqk = [εˆk φˆk cˆ1,k cˆ2,k]
T , and ~ˆUk+1 is set to [Uˆk+1[1] 0 0 0 0 Uˆk+1[6]]
T , where Uˆk+1[1] = gˆk
and Uˆk+1[6] = dˆk, the estimate of envelope detector’s gain and bias, respectively. With
~ˆqk, the algorithm updates the QMC immediately by subtracting this estimate from
the current value in the QMC. In other words, the operation at step k is
~qc,k+1 = ~qc,k − ~ˆqk (2.17)
where ~qc,k+1 is the updated error vector of the QMC.
2.3 Performance Analysis
2.3.1 Traditional LMS Counterpart
The proposed LMS technique updates the QMC and reset vector ~ˆUk in each iter-
ation. Although the proposed technique is easy to implement, it is necessary to find
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its traditional LMS counterpart which is possible for analytical analysis. At iteration
k, substituting (2.10) or (2.12) in (2.14), expanding and recombining yields
ek = (

g
gεp
gφp
gcp1
gcp2
d

T
−

gˆk
−gεc,k
−gφc,k
−gcc1,k
−gcc2,k
dˆk

T
) ~Xk (2.18)
Define
dk =

g
gεp
gφp
gcp1
gcp2
d

T
~Xk, ~Wk =

gˆk
−gεc,k
−gφc,k
−gcc1,k
−gcc2,k
dˆk

(2.19)
where dk is the output of the QM and envelope detector cascade without compensation
and ~wk is the weight vector that need to be adjusted. Then (2.18) is equivalent to
ek = dk − ~W Tk ~Xk (2.20)
In each iteration, the proposed technique updates the QMC with (2.16) and (2.17),
then
~Wk+1 =

gˆk+1
−gεc,k+1
−gφc,k+1
−gcc1,k+1
−gcc2,k+1
dˆk+1

=

gˆk
−gεc,k
−gφc,k
−gcc1,k
−gcc2,k
dˆk

+

g˜k
gεˆk
gφˆk
gcˆ1,k
gcˆ2,k
d˜k

(2.21)
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where g˜k and d˜k are the increment of the estimated envelope detector’s gain and bias
respectively in iteration k. From (2.15) and (2.16)
−µ~ˆ∇k =

g˜k
gˆk+1εˆk
gˆk+1φˆk
gˆk+1cˆ1,k
gˆk+1cˆ2,k
d˜k

(2.22)
With (2.22), (2.21) can be represented as
~Wk+1 ≈ ~Wk − µ′ ~ˆ∇k (2.23)
where µ′ = gˆk+1
g
µ. For small quantities g˜k and d˜k, g˜k ≈ gˆk+1g g˜k and d˜k ≈ gˆk+1g d˜k. For
k large enough, gˆk+1 → g, then µ′ → µ. With (2.20) and (2.23), theoretically, the
proposed technique has a traditional LMS algorithm counterpart for each iteration
with µ′.
2.3.2 Proof of Convergence
The goal of the proposed technique is to adjust qk = qc,k + qp → 0. To prove the
convergence of the QMC in expectation, which is ‖E[qc,k]− (−qp)‖ → 0, we need to
prove ‖E[ ~Wk]− ~Wopt‖ → 0, where ~Wopt = [g gεp gφp gcp1 gcp2 d]T . Because
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‖E[ ~Wk]− ~Wopt‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
E[gˆk]− g
−g(E[εc,k] + εp)
−g(E[φc,k] + φp)
−g(E[cc1,k] + cp1)
−g(E[cc2,k] + cp2)
E[dˆk]− d
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
(2.24)
If ‖E[ ~Wk]− ~Wopt‖ → 0, then (E[εc,k] + εp)2 + (E[φc,k] + φp)2 + (E[cc1,k] + cp1)2 +
(E[cc2,k]+cp2)
2 → 0, which is ‖E[qc,k]−(−qp)‖ → 0, and (E[gˆk]−g)→ 0, (E[dˆk]−d)→
0. Therefore, we will prove ‖E[ ~Wk]− ~Wopt‖ → 0 next.
Define ~˜Wk as the weight error at iteration k, then
~˜Wk = ~Wk − ~Wopt (2.25)
From (2.18), ek = ( ~W
T
opt − ~W Tk ) ~Xk = ~XTk ( ~Wopt − ~Wk). Taking the expected value
of both sides of (2.23) and substituting (2.13) yields the difference equation
E[ ~Wk+1] = E[ ~Wk] + 2µ
′E[ek ~Xk]
= E[ ~Wk] + 2µ
′E[ ~Xk ~XTk ( ~Wopt − ~Wk)]
= E[ ~Wk]− 2µ′RE[ ~˜Wk]
(2.26)
where R = E[ ~Xk ~X
T
k ] is the input correlation matrix. Then, the expected value of
weight error at iteration k + 1 is
E[ ~˜Wk+1] = E[ ~Wk+1]− ~Wopt
= E[ ~Wk]− 2µ′RE[ ~˜Wk]− ~Wopt
= (I− 2µ′R)E[ ~˜Wk]
(2.27)
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After rotating the recursion (2.27), we get
E[v˜k+1,r] = (1− 2µ′λr)E[v˜k,r] (2.28)
where E[v˜k,r] is the r
th element of expected rotated weight errors and λr is the r
th
eigenvalue of R. As long as µ′ < 2
λmax
, as k increases without bound, E[v˜k,r] → 0,
which means ‖E[ ~˜Wk+1]‖ → 0. With (2.25), we proved ‖E[ ~Wk] − ~Wopt‖ → 0 and
‖E[qc,k]− (−qp)‖ → 0. Therefore, the expected value of the QMC elements converge
to the negative value of corresponding QM impairments. With (2.18), one can easily
prove that the mean square error (MSE) converges to zero[10].
Figure 2.3. Overall error in QMC and QM cascade after QMC compensation
Fig. 2.3 and Fig. 2.4 are generated with orthogonal frequency division multi-
plexing (OFDM) input signals. The OFDM signals have the following characteristic:
64 subcarriers, quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) modulation scheme, 8 guard
interval samples. Thus, each OFDM symbol modulates 128 bits and consists of 72
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Figure 2.4. The means square error of the proposed algorithm
sample points. For the OFDM symbols generated, roughly 15% and 5% of total sam-
ple points fall into the simulated diode detector’s square law region and linear region,
respectively. It’s shown that the mean square error converges to approximately zero
and the overall errors in QMC and QM cascade, which are elements in qc,k + qp,
decrease substantially to an extremely small value around zero.
2.3.3 Performance of The Proposed Technique
The goal of our proposed compensation technique is to mitigate the I/Q imbalance
to satisfy (1.1). In addition, since the proposed technique has the ability to use points
falling into the envelope detectors’s both linear and square law regions, it should be
faster than using only linear regions.
To compare the convergence rate, we should compare the rate under the same
steady-state misadjustment, because there is a trade-off between the misadjustment
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and the rate of convergence. The misadjustment in the adaptive process is defined as
[10]
M ≈ µ · tr[R] (2.29)
where tr[R] is the trace of R, which is also the total power of the inputs to the weights.
For linear and square law regions, the expression of ~Xln,k and ~Xsl,k are different as
in (2.12) and (2.10). Therefore, to achieve the same level of misajustment, the step
sizes for linear and square law should satisfy (2.30)
µsl
µln
≈ tr[Rln]
tr[Rsl]
(2.30)
To test the performance of our proposed technique with a practical envelope de-
tector, a simple diode peak-detector, which consists of only one diode, one resistor
and one capacitor, has been simulated with Pspice. We extracted the input/output
voltage characteristic relationship and imported it to Matlab. The simulated envelope
detector has the three working regions: square law, transition and linear, as illustrated
in Section 2.2.2. However, in the square law and linear regions, the input/output re-
lationship is not perfectly square law and linear, which affects the performance of our
proposed technique. Therefore, besides simulating the proposed technique with a real
envelope detector, we should also simulate with a semi-ideal envelope detector, which
is defined as having the same working region range as the real envelope detector but
with an ideal input/output relationship for each region.
In simulations, OFDM signals have been used as the input baseband signal ~vd(t)
in order to verify the behavior of the proposed algorithm. The OFDM signals have
the same characteristic as in Section 2.3.2. For such an input signal, (2.30) yields
µsl
µln
≈ 1.
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Figure 2.5. Convergence performance with a semi-ideal envelope detector. µln =
µsl = 0.2.
Figure 2.6. Convergence performance with a practical envelope detector. µln =
µsl = 0.2.
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Fig. 2.5 is generated with a simulated semi-ideal envelope detector. It shows that
the proposed algorithm working with both square law and linear regions decreases the
EF in (1.1) to the 10−4 level in 200 symbols comparing to the 380 symbols required
for the algorithm working with only linear region.
Fig. 2.6 is generated with a simulated practical envelope detector. Although the
proposed algorithm working with both square law and linear regions decreases the EF
to the 10−4 level faster than algorithm working with only linear region, it is not so fast
as in Fig. 2.5. The reason is that the non-ideal input/output relationship introduce
noises into dk in (2.19), which affects the performance of the technique. Therefore,
if one can generate a practical envelope detector with almost ideal input/output
relationship and use it for our proposed technique, the performance will more closely
match that of Fig. 2.5.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, a fast I/Q imbalance compensation technique for analog quadra-
ture modulators in the direct conversion transmitters has been proposed. We proved
that the proposed technique has a least mean square (LMS) implementation that con-
verges and compared its convergence speed with algorithm only working with envelope
detector’s linear region. The increased parametrization of the envelope detector leads
to more unknowns to be estimated in our I/Q imbalance compensation technique,
but the number of points available for adaptation is also increased in compensation.
The simulation results demonstrate that our proposed technique satisfies (1.1) and
converges slightly faster.
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CHAPTER 3
PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
3.1 Introduction
One of the critical concerns in wireless communication is security of data trans-
mission. Traditionally, security has been the domain of cryptographers, who encrypt
information so that it is easy to decode for a receiver with the appropriate key, but
presents a “hard” problem to the eavesdropper, who is assumed to not be able to solve
“hard problems”[15]. However, there are numerous historical examples of schemes
being broken that were supposedly secure, often when the signal was recorded for
later processing and eventually broken[16], which, combined with recent advances in
computation[17][18], yields clear motivation to consider forms of security that are
provably everlasting.
Hence, there has been a significant revival of interest in information-theoretic tech-
niques which presume no limitation on the eavesdropper’s computational capability.
The theoretical basis for this information-theoretic approach builds on Shannon’s no-
tion of perfect secrecy[19] which stated that to transmit b bits of information securely
required a key of length b, and that key must be kept secret indefinitely. The next
major advance was made by Wyner[20], who studied the so-called ”wiretap chan-
nel” shown in Fig. 3.1. He showed that if the receiver has a better channel than
the eavesdropper, there are schemes that can transmit information at a positive rate
such that the eavesdropper gets almost no information about the transmitted bits
- regardless of the current or future computation capabilities of that eavesdropper.
After Wyner’s work, the problem laid roughly dormant for almost three decades be-
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fore becoming a topic of extreme interest in recent times for guaranteeing secrecy in
wireless communication systems.
Information-theoretic approaches often have difficulty with a near eavesdropper
whose channel is better than the receiver’s channel. Early results showed that the
fading could be exploited, either when the eavesdropper’s channel is known, or when
only statistical information is available on the eavesdropper channel[21]. When the
eavesdropper channel is statistically very good, it can be difficult to maintain a reason-
able secrecy rate, so people have considered various cooperative jamming approaches.
However, such approaches are not robust to the channel model that may be encoun-
tered by the system.
Figure 3.1. Gaussian wiretap channel. Alice encodes a message block, represented
by the random variable Uk, into a codeword, represented by the random variable Xn,
for transmission over the channel. Bob observes the output of the main channel Y nb
and Eve observes the output of the wiretap channel Y ne .
Hence, we are more interested in a second set of techniques, which can operate
when Bob’s channel is worse than Eve’s. An early version of this was the work of
Maurer[22], where public discussion using common randomness provided by a third
party is effective. More recently, authors have exploited two-way schemes; in essence,
Bob generates an (information) secret key that is used to communicate information
over a public channel[24][25]. All of these schemes still need to choose a secrecy rate
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that is a function of the channel parameters, which in turn are a function of the
channel geometry, and thus it is still difficult to guarantee the desired security for a
positive secrecy rate.
Talking a different approach, Cachin and Maurer[23] exploited the realizability of
hardware to consider the case of everlasting security, as is our interest. In particular,
they introduced the “bounded memory model” - signal in such a way that the re-
ceiver cannot store the information it would need to eventually crack the code. This
approach suffers from two detriments:
1. By Moore’s Law(see NAND scaling plot at [26]), the density of memories
increases as at an exponential rate with time.
2. Memories can be stacked arbitrarily subject only to (large) space limitations.
Hence, although the bounded memory model is a viable approach to everlasting
security, it is difficult to pick a memory size beyond which it will be effective, making
its employment for secret wireless communication extremely difficult. Our contention
is that [23] attacked the wrong part of the receiver - the back-end rather than the
front-end. In this thesis, we demonstrate a technique to attack the eavesdropper
receiver’s radio-frequency(RF) front-end such that a short-term cryptographic ad-
vantage can be turned into everlasting security. In short, the trick is to establish
an ephemeral cryptographic key between Alice and Bob (such as employing a Diffie-
Helman protocol) that is used for warping the signal at the transmitter and receiver.
Since Eve does not obtain the key until later, her ADC and unwarping operations are
in a different order than Bob’s, and, because nonlinear and time-varing systems are
not commutative, this can be used to obtain a positive secrecy rate.
3.2 System Model
The enhanced version of the wiretap channel including hardware components in
Fig. 3.2 is considered in this thesis. A legitimate user (Alice) sends signal samples
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Figure 3.2. Enhanced version of the wiretap channel to include hardware compo-
nents. In particular, Alice’s transmitter has a digital-to-analog converter (DAC) and
a power amplifier, whereas Bob and Eve have a low noise amplifier followed by an
analog-to-digital converter (ADC) and automatic gain control (AGC) followed by an
ADC, respectively.
after modulation represented by the random variable sequence Xn to another user
(Bob). The actual signal sent by Alice is the power amplified signal v(t) with power
constraint E{|v(t)|2} ≤ P and
v(t) = x(t) · p(t) (3.1)
where p(t) is the gain of the power amplifier and E{p2(t)} ≤ P
E{|x(t)|2} . Bob receives
the output of an additive white gaussian noise(AWGN) channel given by
ub(t) = v(t) + n(t) (3.2)
where n(t) ∼ N1(0, σ2). Since Bob knows p(t), he can implement an analog-to-digital
converter(ADC) for x(t) and a low noise amplifier (LNA) with gain 1/p(t) to adjust
the dynamic range of the received signal to be compatible with the ADC.
A third party(Eve) is also capable of eavesdropping on Alice’s transmissions. Eve
observes the output of the AWGN channel ue(t). Although Eve does not know p(t)
directly, she could implement an automatic gain control(AGC) loop to adjust the
dynamic range of the received signal to be compatible with her ADC.
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3.3 Automatic Gain Control
In Eve’s receiver, the level of the incoming signal varies over a wide dynamic range
and Eve does not know p(t). Therefore, the AGC loop is critical to make sure the
signal is not out of the ADC’s dynamic range. For analysis, assume Eve is using the
same ADC as Bob, and the AGC loop is then employed to attempt to copy the same
function as the low noise amplifier with gain 1/p(t).
Figure 3.3. Decibel based linear AGC block diagram
A typical decibel based linear AGC model which is widely used is shown in Fig.
3.3. The input signal xA(t) is amplified by an exponential variable gain amplifier
(EVGA), whose gain u(t) is controlled by the signal vA(t) such that u(t) = e
−vA(t).
All modern AGCs tend to approximate the exponential gain characteristic because it
gives the desired dynamic range with a moderate range of the gain control voltage.
Then, the amplitude of yA(t) is
yA(t) = e
−vA(t)xA(t) (3.3)
Following the signal path, the output of the logarithmic amplifier is
zA(t) = lnPA(t) (3.4)
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where PA(t) is the low frequency component of y
2
A(t). With the logarithmic amplifier,
the AGC system operates as decibel based linear, which means that if the amplitude
of the input and output signals of the AGC are expressed in decibels (dB), then the
system response is linear with respect to these values.
The transfer function of the simplest low pass filter that can be used in the system
is F (s) = 1
s
, which is an ideal integrator in the time domain. Combining (3.3) and
(3.4), the expression for the AGC model in the time domain is
yA(t) = exp{−α
∫ t
0
[lnPA(τ)− ln (Pref )]dτ}xA(t) (3.5)
The performance of the designed AGC to a independent and identically distributed
Gaussian input signal sequence is shown in Fig. 3.4. The input signal sequence
xA[n] ∼ N(0, 9); thus, the average power of the input signal is approximately 9.
In the steady state, the average power of the output signal is approximately 1 and
u[n] ≈ 0.33. Although the AGC system successfully adjusted the average power of
the signal, there exists an obvious tracking period. Comparing Fig. 3.4 and Fig. 3.5,
we find that the loop gain α determines the tradeoff between settling time and steady
state error. In a practical AGC system, α is set such that a fast settling time can be
achieved while maintaining a relatively small steady state error.
25
Figure 3.4. AGC input, output and control signals with α = 0.0001
Figure 3.5. AGC input, output and control signals with α = 0.001
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3.4 Proposed technique
Consider the enhanced version of the wiretap channel shown in Fig. 3.2. The
secrecy capacity is given by [27]
Cs = max{0, 1
2
log(1 +
Es
Nb
)− 1
2
log(1 +
Es
Ne
)} (3.6)
where Es =
1
n
∑n
i=1E{|X(i)|2} denotes the average power of the input signal and
Nb and Ne denote the average noise powers for Bob and Eve, respectively. In order
to achieve a positive secrecy capacity, the system should achieve Nb < Ne. For the
enhanced system model considering the RF front-end system, Nb and Ne consists of
two parts: channel noise and RF front-end noise. For a near eavesdropper, Eve has
the same or even a better channel condition than Bob. Therefore, to achieve Nb < Ne,
our proposed technique should increase the RF front-end noise of Eve’s receiver.
This thesis proposes such a technique to deceive the AGC-ADC cascade in Eve’s
receiver RF front-end system while maintaining the proper operation of Bob’s AGC-
ADC combination. At Alice’s side, instead of using a constant p(t) to amplify x(t),
we set p(t) to be a random variable determined by a randomly generated secret key,
which is shared by Alice and Bob. Thus, Bob knows p(t) and amplifies the received
signal with 1/p(t). Therefore, the input signal of its ADC is under a constant signal
power level and cannot be outside of the ADC’s dynamic range.
However, since Eve does not know the key at this time, the most commonly used
option is to implement an AGC loop to adjust the dynamic range of its received signal.
From the last section, it has been shown that the AGC loop needs a settling time.
If p(t) changes the amplification gain level fast enough, the AGC loop will never
reach its steady state. Then the AGC-ADC cascade of Eve’s receiver is deceived,
causing the noise power in Eve’s received signal to be large. Assume Eve gets the
key immediately after the signal passes the ADC, the noise power in her received
27
signal can not be decreased, because the signal is distorted by the failed AGC and
the quantization noise of the ADC is too large.
3.5 Performance Analysis
Fig. 3.6 shows the block diagram to generate the power amplifier gain level p(t).
Figure 3.6. Generate the power amplifier gain p(t)
In this section, we will consider the simplest scenario that the varied power am-
plifier gain samples An are a sequence of discrete random variables with two possible
outcomes Amax and Amin. Thus, it needs one bit of the key to represent each sample.
The random variable is
A(k) =
 Amax, if k = 1Amin, if k = 0 (3.7)
The probability mass function is given by
pA(a) =
 p, if A = Amax1− p, if A = Amin (3.8)
For analysis, we assume that the signal samples Xn come from a Gaussian random
distribution X ∼ (0, σ2x). Note that A should meet the power constraint E[A2] ≤ Pσ2x .
Assume Bob and Eve have the same AWGN channel N ∼ (0, σ2n), then the average
secrecy capacity is
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Table 3.1. Average numbers of clippings in ADC
Channel 0dB 10dB 20dB 30dB 40dB 50dB
Bob 42 46 47 52 53 54
Eve 455 400 667 752 718 702
Ep[Cs] = Cmaxp+ Cmin(1− p) (3.9)
where
Cmax = max{0, 1
2
log(1 +
σ2x
σ2n
A2max
)− 1
2
log(1 +
σ2x
σ2n
A2max
+NRF
)} (3.10)
Cmin = max{0, 1
2
log(1 +
σ2x
σ2n
A2min
)− 1
2
log(1 +
σ2x
σ2n
A2min
+NRF
)} (3.11)
In (3.10) and (3.11), NRF is defined as the power of the RF front-end noise intro-
duced to Eve when the channel input power is σ2x. We assume that NRF is Gaussian
and the ratio of the channel input power to the RF front-end noise power is σ
2
x
NRF
. In
Bob’s receiver, the ADC’s upper and lower extreme voltages can be set as 3σ and
−3σ respectively due to the 3-sigma rule – 99.7% of values drawn from a normal dis-
tribution are within three standard deviations, where σ2 = σ2x + σ
2
n/A
2
min. Although
such an ADC may clip for a few samples due to the other 0.3% of values, its effect
can be neglected. In Eve’s receiver, Eve implements the same ADC with Bob. In
addition, Eve implements an AGC with a small loop gain to achieve constant steady
state control signal, and this control signal is employed as 1/p(t).
Fig. 3.7 and Table. 3.1 are generated via simulation under the assumption that
Bob and Eve have the same channel condition. The only difference between Bob and
Eve is the implementation of their RF front-end system due to whether they know
the key or not. Fig. 3.7 and Table 3.1 shows that a positive secrecy capacity can
be achieved even when Eve has the same channel condition with Bob. It is obvious
to see that the proposed technique deceives the Eve’s AGC block successfully; thus,
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its feedback control signal fails to implement 1/p(t), causing more clippings for Eve’s
ADC.
One can also observe from Fig. 3.7 that the average secrecy capacity increases as
the channel SNR increases. This is because Bob’s received signals are distorted only
by channel noises while Eve’s received signals are distorted by both channel noise and
RF-front end noise caused by gain fluctuations. When the channel SNR is low, the
received signals for both Bob and Eve are severely distorted by channel noise; thus,
the introduced RF-front end noises effect to Eve are not obvious. However, when
the channel SNR is high, Bob’s received signals are almost clear while Eve’s received
signals are mainly distorted by RF-front end noise. Then the advantage of Bob to
Eve becomes obvious and a larger average secrecy capacity is achieved.
Figure 3.7. Average secrecy capacity versus channel SNR. Bob and Eve have the
same AWGN channel condition.
From Fig. 3.8, one can observe that even if Eve has a better channel condition
than Bob, a positive secrecy capacity can still be achieved with our propose technique.
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Figure 3.8. Average secrecy capacity versus γb, for selected values of γe.
As long as Bob has a high SNR, the average secrecy capacity is positive regardless of
Eve’s SNR.
3.6 Games with Eve
Besides implementing a “standard” AGC loop, Eve may have other possible op-
tions to fight against our proposed technique. In this section, we will discuss about
these possible options and the approaches to eliminate these options.
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3.6.1 Optimizing loop filter
Figure 3.9. Secrecy capacity versus channel SNR, for selected values of loop gain α.
Bob and Eve have the same AWGN channel condition.
Eve can optimize her AGC by optimizing the loop filter cutoff frequency. In other
words, Eve can optimize her loop gain α. Fig. 3.9 shows that as the loop gain α
increases, which means that Eve uses a loop filter with higher cutoff frequency, the
average secrecy capacity is decreasing. However, there is a limit for the increasing
of α. If α is too high such as α = 0.1, the average secrecy capacity is smaller than
that with α = 0.05. The reason is that although the AGC’s settling period errors are
decreased with a high loop gain, the steady state errors of the feed back control signal
are increased, which causes the feedback control signal to fluctuate around 1/p(t).
Optimizing the loop filter cutoff frequency is equivalent to find the α such that the
overall errors in the settling time period and in the steady state period are minimum.
However, the dilemma is that decreasing one increases the other. Therefore, a positive
average secrecy capacity is still achievable as long as the amplifier gain level changes
fast enough when Eve optimizes her loop gain.
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3.6.2 Recording the signal and breaking the key
Eve has the option to first record the signal and do unwrapping operation later
with the broken key. To record the signal without the distortion of a failed AGC,
Eve should stop using an AGC and place her ADC’s full scale voltage range to cover
the highest voltage that she receives. However, this approach decreases the ADC’s
resolution for signals amplified with a smaller gain.
Define the gain variation ratio in dB as λ = 20 log Amax
Amin
. Fig. 3.10 and Fig.
3.11 shows that an obvious positive average secrecy capacity is achieved even if Bob
and Eve have the same channel SNR when the SNR is large enough. In the large
channel SNR range (such as more than 38dB in Fig. 3.10 and more than 46dB in
Fig. 3.11), a larger λ leads to a larger average secrecy capacity. Because when signals
are mainly distorted by RF-front end noise caused by gain fluctuations, increasing
λ will cause lower resolution for Eve’s ADC for signals amplified with smaller gain
while maintaining the performance of Bob’s ADC.
However, in the low channel SNR range, enlarging λ cannot obviously increase
the average secrecy capacity. When signals are severely distorted by channel noise,
increasing RF-front end noise does not have much of an impacts. Therefore, in
Fig. 3.10 and Fig. 3.11, the average secrecy capacities are approximately the same
for λ = 20dB and λ = 30dB in the channel SNR range 0 − 38dB and 0 − 46dB,
respectively.
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Figure 3.10. Average secrecy capacity versus channel SNR, for selected values of
gain variation ratio λ = 20 log Amax
Amin
, when an 8-bit ADC is implemented. Bob and
Eve have the same AWGN channel condition.
Figure 3.11. Average secrecy capacity versus channel SNR, for selected values of
gain variation ratio λ = 20 log Amax
Amin
, when a 10-bit ADC is implemented. Bob and
Eve have the same AWGN channel condition.
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3.6.3 Implementing multiple ADC branches
In the above sections, we showed that with two possible power amplifier gain
levels Amax and Amin, it is enough to achieve positive average secrecy capacity if Eve
implements one ADC branch. However, if Eve implements multiple ADC branches,
the proposed technique with only two possible power amplifier gain levels can be
defeated.
Figure 3.12. Eve implements two branches. One consists a variable gain amplifier
with gain G1 =
1
Amax
and the other with gain G2 =
1
Amin
.
For a powerful Eve, she might notice our trick and figure outAmax andAmin. Then,
Eve can implement two branches: one has a low noise amplifier with gain G1 =
1
Amax
and an ADC, the other consists of a low noise amplifier with gain G2 =
1
Amin
and
an ADC, as shown in Fig. 3.12. Eve may record the outputs of the two branches
and later break the key. Then, the recorded outputs of the upper branch and lower
branch are the same as what Bob received for the signals amplified with Amax and
Amin respectively. With the key, Eve can choose the corresponding sections from the
two recorded signals and form her received signal. Then, Eve successfully defeats our
proposed technique and the average secrecy capacity is zero if there is no channel
advantage for Bob.
However, if we use N levels rather than two, Eve should implement N branches
to achieve zero secrecy capacity, which is hard to realize in reality. In addition, if an
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infinite number of gain levels is used by setting An as a sequence of continuous random
variables, it is impossible for Eve to implement infinitely numbers of branches. Then,
a positive average secrecy capacity is achievable even if Bob does not have a channel
advantage.
Figure 3.13. Average secrecy capacity versus number of branches implemented by
Eve. Bob and Eve have the same AWGN channel condition with SNR = 40dB.
In simulation, An are set as a sequence of continues random variables uniformly
distributed between Amin and Amax. Eve implements N branches, each with a low
noise amplifier and ADC. The gain of the amplifier of the kth branch is set as
1
Gk
, where
Gk is set as Amin+(k− 12)Amax−AminN . This means that Eve divides the region between
Amin and Amax into N equal sections and use the middle point of each section as Gk.
Fig. 3.13 shows that the average secrecy capacity is decreasing with an increasing
number of branches implemented. However, even ten branches are implemented, a
positive average secrecy capacity is still achieved.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a technique to deceive the AGC-ADC block in an
eavesdropper’s receiver to increase physical layer data transmission secrecy. By shar-
ing a key with the legitimate receiver and fluctuating the transmitted signal power
level in the transmitter side, a positive average secrecy capacity can be achieved even
when Eve has the same or even better AWGN channel condition. We also examined
the possible options that Eve may choose to fight against the proposed technique and
demonstrated that a positive secrecy capacity can still be achieved when Eve uses
these options.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, two imperfections of practical wireless transceiver designs, which
are I/Q imbalance in transmitters and AGC-ADC cascade defects in receivers, have
been addressed and exploited, respectively. The first imperfection challenges us to
find a compensation technique to mitigate the QM impairments faster. The second
imperfection gives us an opportunity to improve physical layer security.
In the first part, we propose a compensation technique which uses signal samples
falling into the envelope detector’s linear and square law regions. With the ability
to use more transmitted signal samples for adaptation, the QM impairments can
be compensated faster. To evaluate the performance of the proposed technique, we
derive its traditional LMS implementation and prove that the overall impairments
in the QMC and QM cascade converge to zero. Simulation results with a semi-ideal
envelope detector reveal that the proposed technique mitigates the I/Q imbalance
to the acceptable level much faster than an algorithm only working with envelope
detector’s linear region. However, if the envelope detector’s input/output relationship
is not ideal square law or linear, the convergence rate will be affected.
In the second part of the thesis, we propose a technique to attack the eavesdrop-
per’s AGC-ADC cascade by sharing an ephemeral secret key between Alice and Bob
and using it for warping the signal at the transmitter and receiver. By fluctuating the
power amplifier gain between two levels, a positive average secrecy capacity can be
achieved even when Bob has no channel advantage. Furthermore, we consider three
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options that a powerful Eve may choose to fight against the proposed technique when
she notices our trick.
• The first is to optimize the loop gain in its AGC.
• The second is to record the received signal first with losing resolution of the
ADC and use the later broken key to unwrap the recorded signal.
• The third is to implement multiple branches consisting an amplifier and an
ADC each, then record the output of each branch and use the later broken key
to unwrap each recorded signal and form the final correct signal.
The first two options have been shown to be unable to defeat the proposed tech-
nique with two gain levels. However, the third option is able to defeat an approach
with two gain levels by implementing two branches under the assumptions that Eve
can figure out the two gain levels. After noticing this, we propose to use infinitely
many gain levels to warp the signal and demonstrate that a positive average secrecy
capacity is achievable even if Eve implements numerous branches in her receiver.
39
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] J. K. Cavers, “The effect of quadrature modulator and demodulator errors on
adaptive digital predistorters for amplifier linearization,” IEEE Transactions on
Vehicular Technology, Vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 456-466, 1997.
[2] J. K. Cavers and M. Liao, “Adaptive compensation for imbalance and offset losses
in direct conversion transceivers,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology,
Vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 581-588, Nov 1993.
[3] M. Faulkner, T. Mattson, and W. Yates, “Automatic adjustment of quadrature
modulators,” Electron Letters, Vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 214-216, Jan 1991.
[4] D. Hilborn, S. Stapleton, and J. K. Cavers, “An adaptive direct conversion trans-
mitter,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, Vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 223-233,
May 1994.
[5] M. Windisch and G.Fettweis, “Blind I/Q imbalance parameter estimation and
compensation in low-IF receivers,” in Proc. 1st ISCCSP, Hammamet, Tunisia,
pp. 75-78, Mar 2004.
[6] JJ. de Witt and GJ. van Rooyen, “A Blind I/Q Imbalance Compensation
Techique for Direct-Conversion Digital Radio Transceivers,” IEEE Transactions
on Vehicular Technology, Vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 2077-2082, May 2009.
[7] J. K. Cavers, “New methods for adaptation of quadrature modulators and de-
modulators in amplifier linearization circuits,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technology, Vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 707-716, Aug 1997.
[8] Rossano Marchesani, “Digital Precompensation of Impefections in Quadrature
Modulators,” IEEE Transactions on Communictions, Vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 552-556,
Apr 2000.
[9] Behzad Razavi, “Design Considerations for Direct-Conversion Receivers,” IEEE
Transactions on Circuits and Systems-II Analog and Digital Signal Processing,
Vol. 44, no. 6, pp. 428-435, Jun 1997.
[10] B. Widrow, S. D. Stearns, Adaptive Signal Processing, Prentice-Hall, 1985
[11] W. K. Victor, M. H. Brockman, “The Application of Linear Servo Theory to the
Design of AGC Loops,” Proceedings of the IRE, Vol. 48, pp. 234-238, Feb 1959.
40
[12] J. M. Khoury, “On the Design of Constant Setting Time AGC Circuits,” IEEE
Transactions on Circuits and Systems-II Analog and Digital Signal Processing,
Vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 283-294, Mar 1998.
[13] L. Liang, J. Shi, L. Chen and S. Xu, “Implementation of Automatic Gain Con-
trol in OFDM Digital Receiver on FPGA,” 2010 International Conference On
Computer Design and Applications (ICCDA 2010), 2010.
[14] A. Liu, J. An and A. Wang, “Design of a Digital Automatic Gain Control
with Backward Difference Transformation,” Wireless Communications Network-
ing and Mobile Computing (WiCOM), 2010 6th International Conference on,
Sep 2010.
[15] J. Talbot and D. Welsh, Complexity and Cryptography: An Introduction, Cam-
bridge, 2006
[16] R. Benson, “The verona story,” National Security Agency Central Security Ser-
vice, Historical Publications (available via WWW).
[17] J. Eisert and M. Wolf, “Quantum computing,” in Handbook of Nature-Inspired
and Innovative Computing, Spring 2006
[18] P. Shor, “Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete log-
arithms on a quantum computer,” SIAM Journal on Computing, Vol. 26, pp.
1484-1509, October 1997.
[19] C. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell Systems Technical
Journal, Vol. 28, pp. 656-715, 1949.
[20] A. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Systems Technical Journal, Vol. 54, pp.
1355-1387, October 1975.
[21] J. Barros and M. R. D. Rodrigues, “Secrecy capacity of wireless channels,” in
Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Information, Seattle, WA, July 2006, pp. 356-360.
[22] U. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common informa-
tion.” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, May 1993.
[23] C. Cachin and U. Maurer, “Unconditional security against memory-bounded
adversaries,” Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1294, pp. 292-306, 1997.
[24] E. Ardestanizadeh, M. Franceschetti, T. Javidi, and Y. H. Kin, “Wiretap channel
with secure rate limited feedback,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
Vol. 55, pp. 5353-5361, Dec 2009.
[25] G. Amariucai and S. Wei, “Feedback-based collaborative secrecy encoding over
binary symmetric channels,” axXiv:0909.5120v1.
[26] R. Kuchibhatia, “IMFT 25-nm MLC NAND: technology scaling barriers broken,”
EE Times, March 2010.
41
[27] S. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. Hellman, “The Gaussian wire-tap channel,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 24, pp. 451-456, July 1978.
42
